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On the Road to the Merits in Our Federal System: Is 
the “Forum Defendant Rule” a Procedural Speed 
Bump or a Jurisdictional Road Block?  
Aaron E. Hankel∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
While most were celebrating the 2006 holiday season, a team of 
litigators and academics were battling fiercely over the scope of 
federal court removal jurisdiction. Specifically, they disagreed 
whether the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (“Forum Defendant 
Rule”),1 which bars removing a claim from state to federal court if 
the defendant is a resident of the state where the claim was filed, is a 
procedural “speed bump” or a jurisdictional “road block.” If the Rule 
is merely procedural, a plaintiff that fails to seek a remand order 
within the statutory time frame will waive any right to object after 
that time frame has expired.2 However, if the Rule is jurisdictional, 
an action removed in violation of the Rule would not be within the 
subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal court, and thus, not 
amenable to any compulsory remand timeframes.3 Although removal 
jurisdiction issues may not attract as many viewers as the new season 
of American Idol,4 they are still important, as they greatly affect the 
ultimate likelihood of prevailing on the merits.5 Moreover, while the 
 
 ∗ J.D. (2008), Washington University in St. Louis School of Law; B.S. (2005), 
University of Missouri-Columbia. The author would like to thank LeAnn and Madison for their 
sacrifice, support, and love. The author would also like to thank Elizabeth Peterson, Joseph 
Shumow, Professor Frederic Bloom, and the Washington University Journal of Law & Policy. 
 1. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2000). For the text of the statute, see infra note 49. 
 2. See infra note 56. 
 3. See generally Horton v. Conklin, 431 F.3d 602 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 
60 (2006). 
 4. American Idol (FOX television broadcast Jan. 16, 2007). 
 5. See infra notes 60–83 and accompanying text. 
Washington University Open Scholarship










428 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 28:427 
 
 
precise issue presented is not new,6 recent conflicting federal circuit 
decisions have spawned a fresh round of debate on the topic.7 
Lively v. Wild Oats,8 a recent circuit court case interpreting the 
statutory restriction embodied in § 1441(b), has sparked this new 
round of debate.9 In Lively, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
determined that the forum-state restriction provided for in § 1441(b)10 
is not a limitation on the federal courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction.11 
Consequently, the Lively court interpreted the Forum Defendant Rule 
as a procedural technicality, subject to the thirty-day filing limit for 
any motion to remand provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).12  
 
 6. The issue is whether the Forum Defendant Rule, contained in § 1441(b), further 
restricts the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. On brief to the Supreme Court, the 
parties have framed as follows: The Plaintiff in Lively [hereinafter “Lively” or “Petitioner”] 
asks, “[w]hether the forum defendant exception to removal jurisdiction is inapplicable 
whenever a plaintiff seeking remand fails to raise it within thirty days of removal.” Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari at i, Lively v. Wild Oats Mkts., 456 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2006) (No. 04-56682), 
cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1265 (2007).  
 While the Defendant in Lively [hereinafter “Wild Oats” or “Respondent”] questions, 
“[w]hether violation of the no local defendant rule deprives the Federal Courts of subject matter 
jurisdiction when the requirements of diversity jurisdiction are met at all times, the plaintiff 
fails to object to removal and instead completes discovery and the issue is raised sua sponte by 
the District Court.” Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Lively v. Wild 
Oats Mkts., 456 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2006) (No. 04-56682), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1265 (2007). 
 7. Compare Horton, 431 F.3d at 605 (holding that the “better rule” of law requires 
reading the Forum Defendant Rule as a jurisdictional road block on the subject-matter of the 
district courts), with Lively v. Wild Oats, 456 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 
1265 (2007) (holding that the Forum Defendant Rule is a procedural technicality—or a 
procedural speed bump on the road to the merits—that may be waived by the parties in absence 
of a timely petition for remand). 
 8. 456 F.3d at 933. 
 9. See id. In essence, the Forum Defendant Rule restricts removal from a state court to a 
federal district where the defendant is a resident of the state where the action is commenced. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2000). So, for instance, if X is a resident of California and is sued in 
California, under the operation of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), X can not remove the action to federal 
district court, even if the district court would have had original jurisdiction. See infra notes 44–
56 and accompanying text.  
 10. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). Section 1441—titled “Actions Removable Generally”—defines 
and confines removal to cases where the defendant is not a resident of the forum state. Id. For 
the relevant text of the statute, see infra notes 44 and 49. 
 11. Lively, 456 F.3d at 939.  
 12. Id. at 942 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2000)). Rules governing removal procedure are 
set forth in § 1447 and § 1446. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1446–47 (2000) (§ 1446 is titled “Procedure 
for removal” and § 1447 is titled “Procedure after removal generally”). For the relevant text of 
the statutes, see infra notes 54–56. 
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The conclusion at the heart of the Lively decision is of paramount 
significance to litigants, as the win rates can dramatically change 
from a state to federal forum.13 Moreover, the decision is of potential 
significance to federal judiciary, because more actions will likely end 
up in federal courts.14 This significance is exacerbated when one 
considers the emphasis courts place on refraining from the exercise of 
nonexistent jurisdiction.15 While a majority of the circuits that have 
decided this issue are in accord with the Lively decision,16 presently 
the Eighth Circuit has held that a contrary interpretation of § 1441(b) 
is required.17 However, the United States Supreme Court has yet to 
resolve the issue.18 Due to a lack of Supreme Court precedent, the 
 
 13. See infra notes 60–65 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra notes 66–83 and accompanying text. 
 15. See generally Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908) 
(dismissing the action, sua sponte, for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction after years of 
litigation). 
 16. 456 F.3d 933, 940 (9th Cir. 2006). The Lively court recounts these decisions as: 
Our interpretation of § 1441(b) comports with eight of the nine circuits that have 
addressed this issue. See, e.g., Handelsman v. Bedford Vill. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 213 
F.3d 48, 50 n. 2 (2d Cir. 2000) (describing a violation of the forum defendant rule as a 
waivable “procedural defect”); Hurley v. Motor Coach Indus. Inc., 222 F.3d 377, 380 
(7th Cir. 2000) (holding that the forum defendant rule “is more a matter of removal 
procedure, and hence waivable, than a matter of jurisdiction”); Blackburn v. United 
Parcel Serv., Inc., 179 F.3d 81, 90 n. 3 [sic] (3d Cir. 1999) (describing a § 1441(b) 
violation as a waivable removal defect); Pacheco de Perez v. AT & T Co., 139 F.3d 
1368, 1372 n. 4 [sic] (11th Cir. 1998) (same); In re Shell Oil Co., 932 F.2d 1518, 1523 
(5th Cir. 1991) (same); Farm Constr. Servs., Inc. v. Fudge, 831 F.2d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 
1987) (holding that a violation of the forum defendant rule did not strip the district 
court of its jurisdiction because it was a “technical” defect that had been waived); Am. 
Oil Co. v. McMullin, 433 F.2d 1091, 1095 (10th Cir. 1970) (describing a § 1441(b) 
violation as a waivable defect in removal proceedings); Handley-Mack Co. v. 
Godchaux Sugar Co., 2 F.2d 435, 437 (6th Cir. 1924) (describing removal by a forum 
defendant as a “technical” violation).  
Id.  
 17. Hurt v. Dow Chem. Co., 963 F.2d 1142, 1146 n.1 (8th Cir. 1992) (characterizing the 
Forum Defendant Rule as a limitation on the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts). 
See infra notes 114–23. 
 18. Horton v. Conklin, 431 F.3d 602 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 60 (2006) 
(denying certiorari for a decision of the Eighth Circuit that addressed the same issue as the 
Lively court; the court held that the Forum Defendant Rule is a limit on the subject-matter 
jurisdiction of federal courts).  
 Even if there is room for disagreement as to the proper interpretation of the Forum 
Defendant Rule, there is no room to disagree that Supreme Court intervention is necessary. If 
the holding in Lively is correct, then the Supreme Court would need to correct the improper 
construction of the rule advanced by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Moreover, if the 
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rules of the various circuits could have a profound impact on the 
efficient and uniform operations of the federal judiciary.19  
This Note explains why the Supreme Court should have resolved 
this issue, and why it should have reversed the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit and held that the Forum Defendant Rule is a 
jurisdictional defect not capable of being waived by the parties. Part I 
of this Note will briefly discuss the origins and history of federal 
jurisdiction and removal statutes and will also discuss why the Lively 
decision is of consequence to litigators and the judiciary. Part II of 
this Note will present the arguments utilized by the Lively court in 
support of its holding. Finally, Part III will conclude with a critical 
analysis of the arguments in favor of the Lively decision, the correct 
interpretation of the statute, and the relevant policy considerations 
crucial to reach the correct, albeit opposite, conclusion.  
I. HISTORY 
A. The Evolution of Removal Jurisdiction and the Forum  
Defendant Rule 
Rules of jurisdiction in a sense speak from a position outside 
the court system and prescribe the authority of the courts 
within the system. They are to a large extent constitutional 
rules. The provisions of the U.S. Constitution specify the outer 
limits of the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts 
and authorize Congress, within those limits, to establish by 
statute the organization and jurisdiction of the federal courts.20 
Article III of the United States Constitution creates one Supreme 
Court, and leaves the creation of inferior federal courts to the United 
 
Lively decision is incorrect, the Court needs to intervene to correct the improper construction of 
the majority of the circuits. 
 19. See infra notes 79–82 and accompanying text. 
 20. FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 55 § 2.1 (5th ed. 2001) (emphasis 
added). This Note will not focus on the jurisdiction of the federal courts per se. Rather, a 
narrower focus is given to a discussion of whether the forum-state restriction embodied in 28 
U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2000) (containing the Forum Defendant Rule) is a limit upon a federal courts 
subject-matter jurisdiction. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol28/iss1/13
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States Congress.21 Article III extends judicial power (jurisdiction) to 
a limited number of enumerated cases.22 However, removal 
jurisdiction23 is not explicitly mentioned anywhere in the 
Constitution24 and is entirely a creature of statute.25  
Article III is interpreted as empowering Congress with the ability 
to grant jurisdiction to federal courts in three circumstances.26 First, 
Congress can grant federal appellate jurisdiction over cases litigated 
and determined in state courts (i.e., federal appellate and/or habeas 
corpus jurisdiction).27 Second, Congress can grant federal trial courts 
jurisdiction to determine cases filed as an initial matter by a plaintiff 
(i.e., original jurisdiction).28 Finally, Congress can provide for 
 
 21. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. This section states, “The judicial power of the United States, 
shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from 
time to time ordain and establish . . . .” Id. 
 22. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law 
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made or 
which shall be made, under their Authority; [and to a limited number of enumerated cases and 
controversies] . . . .”). See generally Edward Hartnett, A New Trick from an Old and Abused 
Dog: Section 1441(c) Lives and Now Permits the Remand of Federal Question Cases, 63 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1099, 1108–09 (1995). 
 23. See infra notes 43–49. Removal jurisdiction is not an independent right to federal 
court. Rather, it is a descriptor used to connote the method by which an action comes before the 
court. See infra notes 43–49. 
 24. JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 107.03 (3d ed. 2006). 
 25. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441–47. See Hurt v. Dow Chem. Co., 963 F.2d 1142, 1145 (8th Cir. 
1992). 
 26. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 322 (2d ed. 1994). 
 27. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. This section states, 
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in 
which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all 
the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, 
both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the 
Congress shall make. 
Id. See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 315 (1816) (stating “therefore, the 
appellate jurisdiction [of the Supreme Court] must extend beyond appeals from the courts of the 
United States only.”).  
 28. See generally Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922) (“Only the jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court is derived directly from the Constitution. Every other court created by the 
general government derives its jurisdiction wholly from the authority of Congress.”); Martin, 
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 331 (“It would seem, therefore, to follow [from the text of Article III], 
that congress are bound to create some inferior courts, in which to vest all that jurisdiction, 
which, under the constitution, is exclusively vested in the United States, and of which the 
supreme court cannot take original cognizance.”).  
 Whether Article III requires the creation of inferior courts, as Justice Story believed, or 
whether Article III merely permits the creation of inferior courts, as Justice Sutherland believed, 
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removal of claims filed in state courts to federal court (i.e., removal 
jurisdiction).29 By enacting the Judiciary Act of 1789,30 Congress 
embraced the constitutional call, and chose to implement all three of 
these mechanisms to grant federal jurisdiction.31 Despite these 
seemingly stark, conceptually simplistic demarcations in the 
character and origins of federal jurisdiction, there has always been 
considerable overlap in the existence of federal jurisdiction.32 
From its inception,33 removal jurisdiction has undergone 
considerable judicial interpretation and legislative change.34 These 
changes have left the law governing removal rife with confusion and 
incoherence.35 However, the rationale for removal jurisdiction is 
readily identifiable. Where the cause of action involves a federal 
question,36 removal is designed to ensure that the tribunal better 
informed on questions of federal law would adjudicate the matter.37 
Where removal is predicated on the diverse citizenship of the 
litigants,38 removal is designed to protect out-of-state defendants 
 
one aspect of inferior courts’ genesis is clear: Congress, not Article III, technically creates 
inferior courts. See generally id. 
 29. Hartnett, supra note 22, at 1107. 
 30. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (establishing the Judicial Courts of the United 
States).  
 31. Hartnett, supra note 22, at 1108–09. 
 32. Id. at 1109. (detailing instances where federal courts would have both original and 
removal jurisdiction).  
 33. Initially, one basis for removal jurisdiction existed if: 
[A] suit [is] commenced in any state court against an alien, or by a citizen of the state 
in which the suit is brought against a citizen of another state, and the matter in dispute 
exceeds . . . five hundred dollars, . . . and the defendant . . . file[s] for a petition for the 
removal of the cause . . . the cause shall there proceed in the same manner as if it had 
been filed [in federal court] by original process.  
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 2 Stat. 73. 
 34. See generally Hartnett, supra note 22 (detailing the progression of the modern 
removal statutes from their origin). 
 35. Hagerla v. Miss. River Power Co., 202 F. 771, 773 (S.D. Iowa 1912) (“That there is 
no other phase of American jurisprudence with so many refinements and subtleties, as relate to 
removal proceedings, is known by all who have to deal with them.”). 
 36. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) (creating, generally speaking, original 
jurisdiction over actions “arising under” the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States). 
 37. See Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 827 (1986). 
 38. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000) (creating, generally speaking, original 
jurisdiction over actions where the plaintiff(s) and defendant(s) are citizens of different states; 
this has come to be known as “diversity jurisdiction”). See also Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol28/iss1/13
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from a perceived local bias in favor of local plaintiffs while still 
maintaining proper respect for state courts.39  
Ultimately, the goal of removal is to provide a defendant with a 
federal forum.40 In providing a federal forum, the effect of removal is 
to deprive a state court of an action that is properly within its 
jurisdiction.41 As such, removal jurisdiction creates federalism 
concerns.42  
The removal privilege and procedures are statutory, and thus 
governed in various sections of the United States Code.43 The general 
removal statute, which applies to all civil cases, is located in 28 
U.S.C. § 1441(a).44 Under this statute, an action is removable if four 
conditions are satisfied: (1) the action commenced is a civil action 
initiated in state court, (2) the action could have been commenced 
originally in federal court,45 (3) the defendant is the party seeking 
 
(3 Cranch) 267 (1806) (first Supreme Court case to require complete diversity of all litigants for 
proper federal subject matter jurisdiction). 
 39. See United Steelworkers v. R. H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 150 (1965) (discussing 
one of the rationales for diversity jurisdiction is to protect a nonresident litigant from local 
prejudice); Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 109 (1941) (“‘Due regard for 
the rightful independence of state governments . . . requires . . . [federal courts to] scrupulously 
confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute has defined.’”) (citing 
Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934)). See also China Basin Prop., Ltd. v. Allendale Mut. 
Ins. Co., 818 F. Supp. 1301, 1303 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (“The diversity statute is strictly construed, 
and any doubts are resolved against finding jurisdiction.”) (citing Kantor v. Wellesley Galleries, 
Ltd., 704 F.2d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 1983)). 
 40. See Merrell Dow Pharm., 478 U.S. at 809. 
 41. MOORE, supra note 24, § 107.03.  
 42. See California ex rel. Sacramento Metro. Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. v. United States, 
215 F.3d 1005, 1010–14 (9th Cir. 2000); Carpenter v. Wichita Falls Indep. Sch. Dist., 44 F.3d 
362, 365 (5th Cir. 1995).  
 43. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441–47 (2000). The statutory scheme for removal is quite 
unambiguous. The right of removal is governed by § 1441 (actions removable generally). The 
procedure for removal is governed by §§ 1446–47 (procedure for removal and procedure after 
removal generally). See supra note 12 and infra notes 54–56 and accompanying text. 
 44. The statute provides: 
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in 
a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, 
may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United 
States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending. 
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2000). 
 45. That is, the action was within the district court’s original jurisdiction, as limited by 
Article III and the various sections of the United States Code further refining the reach of the 
original jurisdiction of the district courts. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 restricts a district 
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removal,46 and (4) the action is removed to the district court for the 
district and division embracing the state action.47  
Yet, where removal is predicated upon the diversity of the 
litigants, Congress rejected a per se right to removal and conditioned 
the defendant’s right to remove upon his relation to the forum state.48 
This restriction is embodied in § 1441(b),49 and has been dubbed the 
Forum Defendant Rule.50 There is no corresponding restriction upon 
removal where the claim presents a federal question.51 However, 
where the basis for removal is diversity of citizenship, the 
defendant’s right to remove the litigation from a state court of 
competent jurisdiction to the federal courts only exists where the 
defendant is not a resident of the forum state.52 This restriction is 
reasonable considering the rationale for removal of diversity actions, 
namely the possibility for bias against an out-of-state defendant.53  
While the creation of the defendant’s substantive right to remove 
is governed by § 1441, § 1446 governs the procedure a defendant 
must follow to affect the right to remove.54 Assuming a defendant 
 
court’s original jurisdiction to cases where amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 
U.S.C. § 1332 (2000). 
 46. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441.  
 47. Id.  
 48. See infra note 49. A per se right of removal would allow a defendant to remove an 
action currently before a state court to federal district upon the mere showing of original 
jurisdiction (e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or § 1332 has been satisfied). This is not the removal 
scheme Congress has enacted. See infra notes 128–31 and accompanying text. 
 49. The statute provides: 
Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a 
claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall 
be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any other 
such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined 
and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought. 
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 50. The restriction contained in the second sentence of § 1441(b), namely that any other 
civil action shall be removable only if none of the parties is a forum defendant, was first dubbed 
the “Forum Defendant Rule” in Hurley v. Motor Coach Industries, 222 F.3d 377, 378 (7th Cir. 
2000).  
 51. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000). 
 52. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). 
 53. See United Steelworkers v. R. H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 150 (1965). 
 54. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (2000). This statute states: 
A defendant or defendants desiring to remove any civil action or criminal prosecution 
from a State court shall file in the district court of the United States for the district and 
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properly removes, the onus is shifted to the plaintiff to remand the 
action back to state court if he so chooses. Section 1447 governs the 
remand procedure.55 Section 1447(c) requires a plaintiff to remand 
within thirty days of the defendant’s filing a notice of removal, unless 
the remand is predicated on the federal court’s lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction.56  
From these requirements, the issue presented in Lively was raised. 
Namely, is the restriction embodied in the Forum Defendant Rule, 
which prohibits removal of a local action by a local defendant, a 
restriction upon the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal court 
and thus immune from the thirty-day filing limit of § 1447(c)? Or, is 
the restriction procedural and thus subject to the thirty-day filing 
limit? In order to properly appreciate this issue, one must understand 
why it matters and what is at stake. 
 
division within which such action is pending a notice of removal signed pursuant to 
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and containing a short and plain 
statement of the grounds for removal, together with a copy of all process, pleadings, 
and orders served upon such defendant or defendants in such action. 
Id. The statute continues to enumerate certain procedural requirements to properly effect a 
removal. First, the defendant must file for removal within thirty days of service of process. 28 
U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2000). Moreover, “[the] case may not be removed on the basis of [diversity] 
jurisdiction . . . more than 1 year after commencement of the action.” Id.  
 55. 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (2000). Although the remand guidelines listed in § 1447 are 
procedures to effect a remand, failure to follow these procedures does not necessarily confer 
jurisdiction to the federal court. For instance, if a plaintiff files suit against a defendant in a 
court that lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the defendant still must follow certain 
procedures to avoid the court’s jurisdiction. Merely following the procedure to avoid 
jurisdiction obviously does not confer jurisdiction. In the same sense, failing to follow the 
remand procedure should not grant jurisdiction. One should not infer that Congress intended to 
let in the backdoor—or more appropriately, the boarded up window—what is not allowed 
through the front door.  
 56. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2000). This statute states: 
A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of 
removal under section 1446(a). If at any time before final judgment it appears that the 
district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded. An order 
remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, 
including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal. A certified copy of the 
order of remand shall be mailed by the clerk to the clerk of the State court. The State 
court may thereupon proceed with such case. 
Id. 
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B. Why Does This Matter? 
The discussion of why the Forum Defendant Rule establishes a 
jurisdictional road block to the exercise of federal subject-matter 
jurisdiction would be little more than an academic diatribe if the 
consequences were not so dire.57 As detailed below, and further 
explored in Part II of this Note, this rule could potentially harm 
countless litigants, both directly and indirectly.  
The decision of where to file suit, whether in state or federal 
court, is an important decision a plaintiff must make.58 This decision 
can have a profound impact on several areas of the litigation and can 
result in favorable or unfavorable consequences to both the plaintiff 
and the defendant.59 The most severe consequence is the ultimate 
effect removal may have on a plaintiff’s likelihood of success. A 
recent study has indicated that a plaintiff’s probability of prevailing 
on the merits in a case removed to federal court is drastically lower 
than a case originally filed in federal courts.60 This study revealed 
that the win rate for plaintiffs in original diversity cases is 70 percent, 
but in removed diversity cases it is only 34 percent.61 However, this 
result should not be too surprising, considering the entire premise of 
removal is to affect the outcome of the litigation.62 The study 
suggested two possible reasons for this result: the effect of the 
forum,63 and the effect of case selection.64 Despite the inherent 
 
 57. See infra notes 60–83 and accompanying text. 
 58. See infra notes 60–83 and accompanying text. As this discussion illustrates, more than 
the merits are relevant in the ultimate disposition of a claim. 
 59. See infra notes 60–83 and accompanying text. This note only considers the adverse 
impacts that may result to the plaintiff. 
 60. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal 
Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 
581, 602 (1998).  
 61. Id. at 581. 
 62. Id. at 592.  
 63. Id. at 599–602. Here, the authors note several differences between the state and 
federal courts. Of special significance are the differences in civil procedure that tend to favor 
removing defendants, namely the effect of the trier of fact (whether judge or jury) and the 
magnitude of federal judges’ antipathy to plaintiffs. Id. at 601.  
 64. Id. at 602–06. First, the authors note that the representative defendants may be 
litigation averse, and thus only defend cases where they feel they can prevail on the merits (i.e., 
the removed cases represent the weakest plaintiff’s claims). Id. at 603. Second, the authors 
discuss how these plaintiff lawyers may be too “unskilled to prevent removal, and otherwise 
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ambiguity of evaluating removal jurisdiction and win rate data, the 
most likely cause of a plaintiff prevailing on the merits is the effect of 
the forum.65 
This forum effect likely has many origins, but is rooted deeply in 
the decision of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.66 In Erie, the Supreme 
Court declared that where actions are based upon diversity 
jurisdiction and are initiated in federal court, the federal court must 
apply the substantive law of the state in which they sit.67 Essentially, 
Erie stands for the proposition that the substantive law of the state 
will govern any litigation in federal courts in order to assure that the 
judgment of the federal court is substantially similar to what the 
judgment would have been in state court.68 However, the 
substantially similar69 results are not absolute,70 and in all 
 
inferior to the aggressive and knowledgeable defendants’ lawyers.” Id. at 604. As between these 
rationales for such a significant drop in win-rates, the authors believe the weakest claims 
argument is the most likely. Id. However, the authors, noting that this conclusion (that only the 
strongest claims are removed and defended) may be the exact opposite of what is occurring in 
practice, state that “the risk of removal might lead the plaintiffs’ lawyers to discount their 
clients’ chances, resulting in bringing only strong cases, thus leading to a stronger set of 
removed cases. . . . [A]rguments exist that the set of removed cases is, in fact, not a weaker set 
of cases at all.” Id. at 605–06. 
 65. Id. at 607 (“The inherent ambiguity of win-rate data will often yield . . . to sound 
analytic techniques. Here, a study of win-rate data on removal jurisdiction leads to the 
conclusion that forum really does affect outcome, with removal taking the defendant to a forum 
much more favorable in terms of biases and inconveniences.”).  
 66. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 67. Id. at 78. In Erie, the plaintiff, a citizen of Pennsylvania, sued the defendant, 
incorporated in New York, for injuries sustained by the plaintiff resulting from being struck by 
a protruding object from the defendant’s train. Id. at 69–70. The plaintiff initiated suit in New 
York federal court. Id. The trial judge refused to apply the law of Pennsylvania, which would 
have precluded plaintiff’s recovery. Id. at 70. In doing so, the trial judge, who was affirmed by 
the Circuit Court of Appeals, said the issue of which standard of negligence was to be applied 
was a question of federal law, as opposed to state law. The Supreme Court rejected this 
conclusion, and held that absent some express constitutional or statutory directive, federal 
courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction must apply the relevant state law. Id. at 79.  
 The rationale for Erie was twofold. First, it eliminated the potential benefit to a plaintiff of 
forum shopping. Second, it avoided unfair administration of law (i.e., different forums, different 
results). See generally Joseph P. Bauer, The Erie Doctrine Revisited: How a Conflicts 
Perspective Can Aid the Analysis, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1235 (1999). 
 68. See Bauer, supra note 67, at 1255–56. 
 69. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). In Guaranty Trust, the issue was 
whether the federal court, sitting with diversity jurisdiction, must apply the state statute of 
limitations, which would have barred the plaintiff’s recovery. Id. at 107. The Supreme Court 
interpreted Erie as limiting federal courts from reaching a result that a state court would not 
have reached had the litigation proceeded in state court. Id. at 107–09. The result of Guaranty 
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circumstances thus far, federal courts have applied the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.71 Restated, Erie and its progeny establish certain 
circumstances where the procedural rules governing a litigated case 
will vary depending on where the case is litigated (i.e., federal or 
state forum).72 These differences can be substantial, including 
whether or not a jury is to hear and decide an issue,73 which method 
of process must be used,74 whether a unanimous jury verdict is 
required,75 what procedures govern certifying a witness as an 
expert,76 whether federal judges are appointed for life and generally 
 
Trust, simply restated, was that the outcome of the litigation should be substantially the same as 
if the action had proceeded in state court (i.e., an “outcome-determinative” test). Id. at 109. For 
a discussion of the evolution and application of this standard, see Bauer, supra note 67, at 
1257–58.  
 70. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge, 356 U.S. 525 (1958). In Byrd, the Supreme Court had to 
decide whether a judge or a jury should resolve the question of whether an injured party is an 
employee or independent contractor. Id. at 529–30. According to state practice, the question 
should be decided by a judge. Id. at 536. According to federal practice, the issue should be 
decided by a jury. Id. The Supreme Court, in requiring the issue be resolved by a jury, rejected 
the position that the mere possibility that a federal practice may change the outcome of the 
litigation automatically requires application of state law. Id. at 537–38 (“The policy of uniform 
enforcement of state-created rights and obligations . . . cannot in every case exact compliance 
with a state rule—not bound up with rights and obligations—which disrupts the federal system 
of allocating functions between judge and jury.”) (citation omitted). The Byrd Court held that 
the federal policy favoring jury trials, exemplified by the Seventh Amendment, outweighed any 
competing state interests. Id. at 539.  
 71. See generally Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473–74 (1965) (holding that if there is a 
conflicting state and federal rule of procedure, the federal rule is applied unless the rule is 
beyond the rulemaking power extended to the Supreme Court by the Rules Enabling Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 2072 (2000), or the rule is unconstitutional). To date, no Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure has been invalidated as beyond the scope of the Rules Enabling Act. STEVEN 
YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 293 (5th ed. 2000). Moreover, no rule has been held 
unconstitutional. Id. 
 72. See supra notes 66–71. 
 73. See Byrd, 356 U.S. at 536.  
 74. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 461. 
 75. See FED. R. CIV. P. 48. This rule requires that unless stipulated otherwise, all jury 
verdicts for a plaintiff must be unanimous. Id. 
 There is some indication that the defendant in Lively may have sought removal to gain the 
unanimous jury verdict requirement of federal courts, and to avoid the perceived “liberal” juries 
of California. Appellee’s Answering Brief at 5–6, Lively v. Wild Oats Mkts., 456 F.3d 933 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (No. 04-56682), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1265 (2007) (where Lively asserted 
“[o]bviously, [Wild Oats] removed in order to avoid the three fourths state court jury verdict 
requirement and potentially liberal state court juries.”). 
 76. See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (holding the 
federal evidence rules apply in determining the standard for admitting expert testimony in 
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considered immune from political pressures,77 and how large the 
constituency of the jury pool may be.78 While this list is not 
exhaustive, it is demonstrative of how so-called changes in procedure 
can substantially alter substantive rights. 
Aside from the substantial procedural differences between state 
and federal courts, other considerations reveal why this issue is of 
extreme importance. In Klaxon v. Stentor Manufacturing Co.,79 the 
Supreme Court required the federal court to apply the choice-of-law 
rules of the state court where it sits.80 However, there is no guarantee 
that the federal court will reach the same determination as the state 
court would have reached regarding which law applies.81 If such is 
the case, and the federal court chooses to apply a different law than 
the state court would have, the consequence of improperly exercising 
jurisdiction not only changes the rules of the game (i.e., the 
procedure), it changes the game itself (i.e., the substantive law). 
 
federal cases). Since states may have differing rules of evidence, state courts may provide for a 
different standard to determine whether the witness is indeed an expert.  
 77. MOORE, supra note 24, § 100.04. 
 78. Id. § 120.20. 
 79. 313 U.S. 487 (1941). 
 80. Id. at 496–97.  
 81. This discussion focuses on principles of choice-of-law. States have selected various 
choice-of-law methods. Minnesota, for instance, utilizes the “better law” approach to reconcile 
conflicting laws. Milkovich v. Saari, 203 N.W.2d 408 (Minn. 1973). Under this approach, if a 
conflict of laws exists, Minnesota courts are obligated to apply the law they deem as the better 
law. Id. at 413 (stating that Minnesota decisions “indicat[e] our preference for the better-law 
approach. . . . We have come to the conclusion in this case that plaintiff should be allowed to 
proceed with her action under our common-law rules of negligence and should not be bound by 
the guest statute requirements of the [other jurisdiction].”).  
 However, the test is inherently malleable and subject to the personal reflections of the 
bench. See Jepson v. Gen. Cas. Co., 513 N.W.2d 467, 473 (Minn. 1994) (defining the “better 
law” as the rule that makes “good socio-economic sense for the time when the court speaks”) 
(citation omitted). To illustrate how confusing the “better law” approach can become, the 
Jepson court stated: “Sometimes different laws are neither better nor worse in an objective way, 
just different.” Id.  
 Plainly, whether a rule of law is better, worse, or simply “just different” is a judicial 
determination that cannot be predicted with any certainty. As such, a different court (e.g., a 
federal court instead of a state court) will necessarily entail a different determination of which 
law is better, worse, or merely different. The difference in applicable law is further exacerbated 
by the trend in “modern” approaches to apply the law of the forum state. See generally Michael 
E. Solimine, An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of Law, 24 GA. L. REV. 49 (1989) 
(finding a pro-forum orientation in choice of law selection). If the question presented is decided 
in federal court, there is no guarantee that the federal court will not buck this trend and apply 
the foreign law.  
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There are numerous other practical considerations that stem from 
the litigation proceeding in the federal forum. For instance, the 
docket of a federal court may be more congested and it may take 
longer to reach a trial.82 Moreover, by treating the removal 
jurisdiction as coextensive with original jurisdiction, the number of 
cases in federal courts will likely increase, further exacerbating an 
already congested docket.83 Finally, the plaintiff’s attorney may not 
be admitted in the federal court or may be unfamiliar with federal 
procedure.84  
With the myriad of reasons establishing why the forum selection 
process is of supreme importance, one would assume the logic of the 
Lively court would be sound. Why else would the Lively court divest 
a California state court of its jurisdiction and Lively of her right to 
choose the forum? Unfortunately, critical examination of the Lively 
decision reveals that this is not the case. 
C. Lively v. Wild Oats85 
The decision in Lively was consistent with the majority of the 
courts.86 As such, the decision was not unexpected. However, the 
mere fact that the decision was expected does not make it acceptable.  
1. Background 
In Lively, the plaintiff filed a personal injury action against Wild 
Oats in California state court.87 In this action, Lively sought damages 
resulting from a slip-and-fall accident that occurred on Wild Oats’s 
property.88 Both parties agreed that the amount in controversy 
 
 82. MOORE, supra note 24, § 107.04.  
 83. Approximately 12 percent of all cases in federal courts—some 31,000—are cases 
removed to federal courts. Admin. Off. U.S. Cts., Judicial Business of United States Courts, 
Table S-7, at 58 (1998). See also MOORE, supra note 24, § 107.04. 
 84. MOORE, supra note 24, § 107.04. 
 85. Lively v. Wild Oats Mkts., 456 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1265 
(2007). 
 86. See supra note 16. 
 87. Lively, 456 F.3d at 936. 
 88. Id. 
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exceeded $75,000.89 Lively was a citizen of New York, and Wild 
Oats was incorporated in Delaware.90 In its notice of removal, filed 
on September 26, 2003, Wild Oats improperly stated that its principle 
place of business was Colorado.91 Based upon this improper 
assertion, Lively did not seek a remand to state court.92  
The litigation proceeded in federal court without incident until 
August 25, 2004, when the district court ordered Wild Oats to show 
cause why the case should not be remanded to state court for lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction.93 The district court instructed Wild Oats 
to produce its percentage of gross revenue generated in California, its 
percentage of tangible property then present in California, and its 
percentage of employees employed in California.94 Wild Oats failed 
to provide the district court with this requested information,95 and the 
district court then took judicial notice that Wild Oats’ principle place 
of business was California (the forum state), and not Colorado as 
alleged.96 Upon making this finding, the district court remanded the 
 
 89. Id. This, along with diversity of citizenship, is a prerequisite for the court to have 
diversity jurisdiction over the action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000), supra note 38. 
 90. Lively, 456 F.3d at 936. 
 91. Id. The principle place of business and the state of incorporation both establish a 
corporation’s citizenship for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) 
(2000) (“[A] corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has been 
incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business . . . .”). 
 92. Lively, 456 F.3d at 936. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Appellee’s Answering Brief at 4, Lively v. Wild Oats Mkts., 456 F.3d 933 (No. 04-
56682) (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1265 (2007). The district court felt this 
information was relevant to establish Wild Oats’ principle place of business. Id. The district 
court sought this information because the Ninth Circuit applies the “total activities” test to 
determine a corporation’s principle place of business. Id. (citing Indus. Tectonics, Inc. v. Aero 
Alloy, 912 F.2d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 1990)). Under this test, the court takes into account all the 
aspects of the corporation’s business. Indus. Tectonics Inc., 912 F.2d at 1094. This includes the 
volume of sales, purchases, operating income, production, employees, and the value of the 
corporation’s tangible property in each state where the corporation does business. Id.  
 Wild Oats contended that all the information requested in the show cause order was 
produced. Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 5, Lively v. Wild Oats Mkts., 456 F.3d 933 
(No. 04-56682) (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1265 (2007). Wild Oats boldly asserted 
“it does not matter whether [Wild Oats] is a citizen of Colorado or California because that is not 
the issue.” Id. 
 95. Appellee’s Answering Brief, supra note 94, at 4–5.  
 96. Id. Petitioner summarized the events as follows: 
The district court, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201, took judicial notice [of 
Wild Oats’s] website, www.wildoats.com, which evidenced the fact that [Wild Oats] 
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case to state court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because the 
case was removed in violation of the Forum Defendant Rule.97 Wild 
Oats timely appealed the motion to remand issued by the district 
court, and the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court order.98 In 
vacating, the Lively court held that the restriction embodied in § 
1441(b) is a procedural, or at least “non-jurisdictional,” rule.99 The 
court rationalized its holding on three separate theories: the 
legislative history of § 1447(c), the policy rationale behind § 1441(b), 
and the prevailing law of the other circuits and Supreme Court 
precedent.100  
2. The Rationale of the Lively Court 
The Lively court justified its holding upon three separate theories, 
each of which will be addressed separately. 
 
operates a larger number of stores in California than Colorado or any other state. 
Based on th[is] information . . . the district court found that [Wild Oats] was indeed a 
citizen of California and properly found that removal of this action was barred by 28 
U.S.C. § 1441(b) since [Wild Oats] was, in fact, a [forum] defendant. 
Id. at 5. 
 97. Lively, 456 F.3d at 936–37 (“[T]he district court determined that removal was 
improper because Wild Oats, a California citizen and local defendant, violated the forum 
defendant rule contained in § 1441(b). The court determined that this violation ‘constitute[d] a 
jurisdictional defect’ and therefore remand was ‘timely and proper’ pursuant to § 1447(c).”).  
 The district court’s determination that the remand order was “timely and proper” was 
contingent upon how it characterized the Forum Defendant Rule (i.e., whether it held the 
violation of the Forum Defendant Rule creates a procedural speed bump or a jurisdictional road 
block). If a violation of the Forum Defendant Rule is jurisdictional, a remand order can be 
issued at “any time before final judgment.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2000). However, if the 
Forum Defendant Rule is procedural (or in the words of the Lively court, “non-jurisdictional”), 
a violation of the Rule would be a defect other than lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and a 
motion for remand would need to be made within thirty days of the notice of removal. Lively, 
456 F.3d at 936–37. In remanding the case, the district court determined that the Forum 
Defendant Rule placed a restriction on the removal jurisdiction of the court (i.e., that on the 
road to the merits in our federal system of government, the Forum Defendant Rule created a 
jurisdictional road block). Id. at 936. 
 98. Lively, 455 F.3d at 937, 942. 
 99. Id. at 939. 
 100. Id. at 939–40. 
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a. The Legislative History of § 1447(c) Requires Interpreting 
the Forum Defendant Rule as Procedural 
The Lively court began by reciting the relevant statutory changes 
in the language of § 1447(c).101 The court noted that as originally 
written, § 1447(c) required a district court to issue a remand order if 
the case had been “removed improvidently and without 
jurisdiction.”102 However, in 1998, Congress amended this original 
language due to the ambiguous nature of the term “improvidently.”103 
The amended language of § 1447(c) required a district court to 
remand where there was “any defect in removal procedure.”104 As a 
result of this changed language, removal defects that were not 
traditionally recognized as procedural, but were also not considered 
to affect the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court, occupied a grey 
area in removal jurisprudence.105 Congress again revised the language 
of § 1447(c) in 1996, replacing “any defect in removal procedure,” 
with “any defect other than lack of subject-matter jurisdiction must 
be made within 30 days after the filing of notice of removal under § 
1446(a).”106 
Interpreting these changes, the Lively court concluded that 
Congress intended to ensure more substantive removal defects—like 
removal in violation of the Forum Defendant Rule—were subject to 
the thirty-day filing limit.107  
 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1948)).  
 103. Lively, 456 F.3d at 939. 
 104. Id. While the language of what constituted a “defect in removal procedure” was an 
improvement over “improvident,” courts remained confused as to what removal defects 
triggered the thirty day time limit. Id. (citing David D. Siegel, Commentary on 1996 Revision of 
Section 1447(c), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447 (West. Supp. 1988)). 
 105. Lively, 456 F.3d at 939. 
 106. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 104-219, § 1 (1996)). 
 107. Lively, 456 F.3d at 939 (citing with approval Snapper, Inc. v. Redan, 171 F.3d 1249, 
1257–58 (11th Cir. 1999)). 
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b. The Rationale for the Forum Defendant Rule Supports the 
Conclusion that It Is Not a Jurisdictional Restriction 
The Lively court’s second rationale for treating the Forum 
Defendant Rule as procedural was predicated on the purpose of the 
Rule.108 As stated, the primary rationale for allowing a defendant to 
remove cases involving diversity of citizenship to a federal forum is 
to protect out-of-state defendants from the possible prejudices against 
the defendant in foreign state courts.109 The need for such protections 
does not exist when the defendant is a resident of the forum state.110 
The Lively court reasoned that a procedural characterization of the 
Forum Defendant Rule honored the purpose of the Rule by allowing 
a plaintiff to regain control over the forum selection process, if the 
plaintiff so desired.111 The court apparently expressed dismay with a 
jurisdictional reading of the Rule, which the court conceded would 
also allow the plaintiff to regain control over the forum selection 
process, because a jurisdictional characterization would require the 
district court to remand cases sua sponte, even if the plaintiff 
preferred to stay in federal court.112 
 
 108. Lively, 456 F.3d at 940. 
 109. Id. (citing Tosco Corp. v. Cmtys. for a Better Env’t., 236 F.3d 495, 502 (9th Cir. 
2001) (“The purpose of diversity jurisdiction is to provide a federal forum for out-of-state 
litigants where they are free from prejudice in favor of a local litigant.”). See supra Part I.A. 
 110. Lively, 456 F.3d at 940. 
 111. Id. The Lively court explained its reasoning by stating: 
[T]he forum defendant rule allows the plaintiff to regain some control over forum 
selection by requesting that the case be remanded to state court. A procedural 
characterization of this rule honors this purpose because the plaintiff can either move 
to remand the case to state court within the 30-day time limit, or allow the case to 
remain in federal court by doing nothing. Either way, the plaintiff exercises control 
over the forum.  
Id. The Lively court made no attempt to explain why a plaintiff would file an action in state 
court, where the action could have been brought in federal court, and then wish to remain in 
federal court. 
 112. Id. (citing Skranak v. Castenada, 425 F.3d 1213, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that a 
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction can not be waived, and may be addressed sua sponte)). The 
Lively court seems to base its characterization upon the principle that a procedural 
characterization allows the plaintiff to exercise his or her discretion in seeking a remand, and 
thus allows the plaintiff to regain his control over forum selection. Lively, 456 F.3d at 940. The 
court conceded that the jurisdictional reading would effect the same end, allowing the plaintiff 
to “exercise control” over the forum selection process. Id. The court seems to disagree with a 
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c. The Weight of Authority and Supreme Court Precedent 
The Lively court also supported its holding by referring to the 
weight of authority that had previously decided the issue and what 
the court perceived to be the improper reasoning of the Eight Circuit, 
the lone dissenting circuit.113 While the Lively court merely cited the 
supporting decisions, it invested a significant level of discussion in 
attacking the rationale of the Eighth Circuit opinion of Hurt v. Dow 
Chemical Co.114  
In Hurt, the plaintiff brought an action against Dow Chemical 
Company, the manufacturer of the pesticide Dursban, and Rose 
Exterminator Company, the exterminating company that applied 
Dursban.115 After defendant’s removal and several other procedural 
steps,116 the Hurt court was ultimately presented with the same 
question at issue in Lively.117 The court, after concluding that removal 
based upon federal question jurisdiction was improper, held that 
removal was also improper where the defendant removed the case in 
violation of § 1441(b).118 The Hurt court reasoned that removal 
jurisdiction is a creature of statute, and that in order for removal to be 
permissible, the statutory requirements of removal jurisdiction must 
 
jurisdictional characterization because it would require a district court to remand the action 
back to state court, even where both parties wanted to remain in federal court. Id.  
 113. Lively, 456 F.3d at 940–41. 
 114. 963 F.2d 1142 (8th Cir. 1992).  
 115. Id. at 1143.  
 116. The Hurt court described the procedural posture as: 
Dow, with Rose’s consent, filed a petition to remove the case to federal court on the 
basis of federal-question removal jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441. . . . After 
removal, Dow filed a motion to dismiss . . . [which was granted] but [the district court] 
specifically stated that any other state-law claims . . . were not pre-empted. Plaintiff 
then filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint, which was granted . . . 
Shortly thereafter, she filed an amended complaint . . . [and] moved to remand the case 
to state court, asserting that the case had been improperly removed on federal-question 
grounds. The District Court denied the motion, holding that removal on federal-
question grounds was proper at the time of removal, Hurt ‘waived any non-
jurisdictional objection to the impropriety of removal,’ Hurt v. Dow Chemical 
Company, No. 90-0783-C(3), slip op. 3 (E.D.Mo. May 22, 1991), and that diversity 
jurisdiction existed even if federal-question jurisdiction did not. Hurt then voluntarily 
dismissed her remaining claims and appealed to this Court.  
Id. at 1143–44. 
 117. Id. at 1144 (“The sole question we address here is, was removal proper?”). 
 118. Id. at 1144–45. 
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be satisfied.119 The court detailed how the statutory requirements for 
removal were not met, as one of the defendants was a resident of the 
forum state.120 The court determined that the mere possibility that the 
plaintiff could have invoked the original jurisdiction of the district 
court was irrelevant, as the plaintiff specifically elected the 
jurisdiction of the Missouri state court.121 Resolution of this issue, the 
court determined, was insufficient to remand the case. The Hurt court 
next addressed the applicability of the Supreme Court decision in 
Grubbs v. General Electric Credit Corp.122 The Hurt court 
distinguished the Grubbs decision on the grounds that “the plaintiff 
[in Grubbs] had never objected to removal in the district court,” and 
the plaintiff in Hurt had so objected.123 
The Lively court rejected the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit in 
Hurt, stating “if the removal statute imposes jurisdictional 
requirements, as Hurt holds, a plaintiff’s non-objection on the one 
hand and untimely objection on the other is a distinction without a 
difference.”124 According to the Lively court, this is a “distinction 
 
 119. Id. at 1145. 
 120. Id. In Hurt, the defendants were residents of Delaware and Missouri, and the plaintiff 
was an Illinois domiciliary. Id. The action was filed in Missouri state court. Id. Despite the 
complete diversity requirement being satisfied, the court concluded that the removal was 
improper in view of § 1441(b), because one of the defendants was a resident of the forum state. 
Id.  
 121. Id. Specifically, the court found that the Forum Defendant Rule makes “diversity 
jurisdiction in removal cases narrower than if the case were originally filed in federal court by 
the plaintiff.” Id. 
 122. 405 U.S. 699 (1972). In Grubbs, the action was removed to federal court, and the 
removal was never challenged. Id. at 701. After the district court entered final judgment, the 
plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Id. The Fifth Circuit, acting sua 
sponte, determined that there had never been federal jurisdiction because removal was improper 
and remanded the action back to state court. Id. at 702. The Supreme Court reversed, stating 
“where after removal a case is tried on the merits without objection and the federal court enters 
judgment, the issue [becomes] not whether the case was properly removed, but whether the 
federal district court would have had original jurisdiction of the case had it been filed in that 
court.” Id. The Hurt court described the Grubbs holding as:  
[W]here after removal a case is tried on the merits without objection and the federal 
court enters judgment, the issue in subsequent proceedings on appeal is not whether 
the case was properly removed, but whether the federal district court would have had 
original jurisdiction of the case had it been filed in that court.  
Hurt, 963 F.2d at 1145 (emphasis added). 
 123. Id. at 1146.  
 124. Lively v. Wild Oats Mkts., 456 F.3d 933, 942 n.12 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 
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without a difference” because a defect in subject-matter jurisdiction 
is not capable of being waived and federal courts have an obligation 
to determine if it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.125 
II. ANALYSIS 
For many reasons, the decision in Lively is incorrect. The Lively 
court interpreted the textual changes to the removal statute as 
supporting a procedural characterization of the Forum Defendant 
Rule.126 However, as noted by Petitioner, this construction ignores the 
clear will of the legislature in drafting and passing the present 
removal scheme.127 
First, the statutory scheme governing removal is quite clear. The 
statutory grant of removal jurisdiction—§ 1441, titled “Actions 
removable generally”—contains the Forum Defendant Rule.128 This 
 
S. Ct. 1265 (2007). 
 125. Id. In so holding, the Lively court also rejected the holding of WRS Motion Picture & 
Video Laboratory v. Post Modern Edit, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 876 (C.D. Cal. 1999). In WRS, the 
district court issued a remand order, sua sponte, based upon a removal in violation of the Forum 
Defendant Rule. Id. at 877–78. The WRS court reasoned that the Forum Defendant Rule placed 
an additional limitation on the original diversity jurisdiction of the district court, and a violation 
of this limitation precluded the court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. The WRS 
court, like the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Hurt, distinguished the Grubbs 
decision on the grounds that the case had not yet been tried on the merits. Id.  
 Recall that Grubbs stated that removal defects are waived, and the issue collapses into a 
question of subject-matter jurisdiction if the removal went uncontested until such a time where 
the case had been tried on the merits and a final judgment had been entered. Grubbs, 405 U.S. 
at 701. The holding in Grubbs, while seemingly controlling, has not been implicated by the 
facts present in Lively. See infra notes 146–48 and accompanying text. 
 The Lively court believed that this distinction, as the distinction in Hurt, misunderstood the 
import of the Supreme Court’s decision in Grubbs. Lively, 456 F.3d at 941. While noting that 
the Grubbs Court expressly stated that a removal defect “may not be raised for the first time on 
appeal,” the Lively court stated that a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any 
time. Id. at 941–942. 
 126. See generally supra notes 102–07 and accompanying text. 
 127. See generally Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 6, at 13–14. 
 128. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988). The statutory scheme indicates that the provisions of § 1441 
define when an action is within the proper metes and bounds of removal jurisdiction. See Brief 
for the Petitioner, supra note 6, at 13–14. Had Congress intended for the restriction to be 
nothing more than a procedural speed bump as opposed to a jurisdictional road block, Congress 
would have surely placed the restriction with the two sections of the U.S. Code governing 
removal procedure. At the very least, this negates the interpretation of the legislative history 
advanced by the Respondent and the Lively decision. See supra notes 102–07 and 
accompanying text.  
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is in stark contrast to the sections of the United States Code that 
outline the procedure of removal and remand.129 As such, any 
characterization of the Forum Defendant Rule as procedural denies 
legislative will at the most basic level.130 The very essence of this 
contention, in its simplest terms, is that any attempt to remove an 
action that is not “removable generally” is inoperative.131 In fact, 
 
 129. Recall that § 1446 is titled “Procedure for removal” and § 1447 is titled “Procedure 
after removal generally.” See supra note 12. 
 130. To consider this argument fully, consider how absurd the opposite conclusion would 
sound. Section 1446(a) requires the removing party to sign the notice of removal pursuant to 
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (1988). Would the Lively 
court be so bold as to classify this requirement as limiting the removal jurisdiction of the 
District Court? Surely not. One would imagine this hypothetical Lively court would point to the 
title and purpose of § 1446 (Procedure for Removal), and conclude that the requirement is 
clearly of the type that should be classified as procedural. 
 131. This is the logic seized by the Eighth Circuit in the Hurt decision. See Hurt v. Dow 
Chem. Co., 963 F.2d 1142, 1145 (8th Cir. 1992). The Hurt court explained: 
In order for Dow and Rose to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court, they must 
meet the statutory requirements for removal jurisdiction. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) 
makes diversity jurisdiction in removal cases narrower than if the case were originally 
filed in federal court by the plaintiff. A defendant may not remove to federal court on 
the basis of diversity if any of the defendants is a citizen of the state where the action 
was filed. As we have stated, defendant Rose is a citizen of Missouri. The fact that 
Irene Hurt could have invoked the original jurisdiction of the federal court initially is 
irrelevant. She did not. The jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, both original and 
removal, is entirely a creature of statute. See Continental Cablevision v. United States 
Postal Service, 945 F.2d 1434, 1435 (8th Cir. 1991). If one of the statutory 
requirements is not met, the district court has no jurisdiction. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 In other words, the notice of removal filed by Wild Oats was worth nothing more than the 
piece of paper it was filed on. It did not carry any legal force. To reach the opposite conclusion 
would erroneously deny the will and direction of the enacting Congress. By analogy, a court 
would not think twice about disregarding a properly recorded deed purporting to sell land not 
owned by the grantor. Where the legal right does not exist, whether by statute or otherwise, a 
party can not artificially create the right.  
 By the very nature of the statute conferring a right to remove (28 U.S.C. § 1441), an 
attempted removal of an action that is not “removable generally” carries no legal weight. To 
borrow an edifying term from corporate law, the attempted removal here was “ultra vires,” or 
“beyond the . . . power . . . allowed . . . by law.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1559 (8th ed. 
2004). Simply restated, when Wild Oats removed, nothing happened. The action was not 
removable, and thus, was not removed. Questions concerning removal and remand procedure 
are irrelevant, as they only become germane once a generally removable action has been 
removed. See Hurt, 963 F.2d at 1145; Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 6, at 13–14; supra 
note 28 and accompanying text (recounting the genesis of the inferior federal courts and 
explaining that any and all authority to exercise jurisdiction is a matter of statutory grace, not 
constitutional compulsion). 
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courts have routinely used this “dead on arrival” approach for similar 
situations, and application here would require no additional or novel 
judicial tools.132 
Second, the procedural characterization eviscerates any distinction 
between removal and original jurisdiction. Essentially, the decision 
makes the two coextensive, subject only to the will of the removing 
party.133 The Lively court justified this position by asserting that the 
non-moving party can still exercise “some control” over the forum 
selection process by deciding whether to seek a remand.134 This 
rationale, however, is unsupportable upon examination. The Lively 
court used the rationale for the exception as a means to swallow a 
portion of the general rule.135 In addition, had Congress intended for 
removal jurisdiction to be coextensive with original jurisdiction, it 
surely would have articulated that.136 Moreover, if the Lively decision 
 
 132. See generally N. Ill. Gas Co. v. Airco Indus. Gases, Inc., 676 F.2d 270, 273 (7th Cir. 
1982) (holding removal petition defective where defendant failed to allege a short and plain 
statement of facts which entitled petitioner to remove and petitioner failed to include all named 
defendants in notice of removal); Home Owners Funding Corp. of Am. v. Allison, 756 F. Supp. 
290, 291 (N.D. Tex. 1991). 
 133. The relevant inquiry, according to the Lively court, is whether the case is within the 
original jurisdiction of the district court (i.e., the case could have been filed there at first 
instance). Lively v. Wild Oats Mkts., 456 F.3d 933, 940 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 
1265 (2007). See generally supra notes 108–12. 
 134. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 135. Much can be made of this point, and it depends on personal characterization. The 
general rule is that an action cannot be removed. This general rule is supported by the fact that 
Congress did not give defendants a per se right to remove cases. See supra note 48.  
 There are, of course, exceptions to this general rule. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000). 
Specifically, where the question presented is one of federal law or the litigants are diverse 
citizens. Id. Under this framework, the Forum Defendant Rule is a situation where the exception 
is not applicable.  
 Here, the Lively court uses the rationale of the exception (i.e., a right to certain diversity 
cases because of the perceived local bias) to swallow a portion of the general rule (that removal 
is not necessary or available).  
 136. Consider the lengthy discussion the Lively court gives to the legislative history of the 
current removal scheme. See generally supra notes 102–07 and accompanying text. Clearly, by 
the very rationale used by the Lively court, Congress paid considerable attention to this topic. If 
this is so, and the Lively court reached the proper conclusion, query why Congress did not state 
explicitly: “All cases which may have been brought in a District Court of the United States can 
be removed.” This hypothetical removal scheme would have been an effective means to the 
ends the Lively court believed the enacting Congress desired. It certainly would have been 
simpler than the judicial inferences. 
 Simply stated, Congress did not intend for original jurisdiction to swallow removal 
jurisdiction. The enacting Congress intended for the division to remain vital and distinct. 
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were correct, Congress likely would have extended the time in which 
a party can seek remand, especially in cases where the citizenship of 
the parties is subject to dispute.137 The Lively interpretation, while 
eviscerating any meaningful distinction between removal and original 
jurisdiction, refuses to recognize that Congress specifically 
enumerated classes of cases where original jurisdiction and removal 
jurisdiction are not coterminous.138 
Third, the Lively decision implies that Congress intended the 
presence of a local defendant as a basis to seek remand, and not as a 
bar to removal.139 However, this interpretation is inconsistent with the 
language of the statute and the statutory scheme.140 The plain 
language of § 1441 explicitly states that the presence of a local 
defendant is a jurisdictional road block.141 Despite this clear 
indication, the Lively interpretation will shift unfairly the burden of 
 
However, this is exactly what the Lively decision does, as the facts illustrate. Here, a party 
ended up in federal court merely because the action could have been commenced in federal 
court.  
 137. A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction must be made within thirty days after the filing of the notice of removal. 28 
U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2000). However, under the Lively construction, we are left with an 
anomalous fact pattern. Consider a notice of removal and a lengthy evidentiary dispute as to 
whether the district court has subject-matter jurisdiction (i.e., the amount in controversy is not 
evident or contested, or the citizenship of various parties is in dispute). How, under the 
construction proffered by the Lively court, should these issues be resolved? If the court 
ultimately determines it does not have subject-matter jurisdiction, no remand order is necessary. 
28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). However, if the court determines it would have had subject-matter 
jurisdiction but the action was improperly removed (e.g., the action was removed by a forum 
defendant) the plaintiff should be allowed to seek remand.  
 138. See 28 U.S.C. § 1445 (2000) (detailing certain classes of cases which are not 
removable, such as civil actions brought in state courts arising under the state’s workmen’s 
compensation laws or actions brought in state courts arising under § 40302 of the Violence 
Against Women Act of 1994). 
 An interesting question would arise if the Lively court is ultimately affirmed, namely how a 
court would treat a removed action in violation of the prohibitions contained in § 1445. Under 
the construction offered by the Lively court, it would seem that the directive of § 1445 is 
procedural, even though it purports to remove the action from the removal jurisdiction of the 
district courts. If subject-matter jurisdiction exists in Lively, then an action removed in violation 
of § 1445 must also be “non-jurisdictional.” However, this is a clear over-extension of the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts. The point remains that Congress intended for removal 
jurisdiction to contain a narrower class of cases than original jurisdiction.  
 139. Lively, 456 F.3d at 939–41. 
 140. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), supra note 44. The statutes governing the removal scheme 
are silent as to when a party can seek a remand.  
 141. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), supra note 49.  
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seeking remand to the plaintiff.142 However, by the terms of the 
statute granting removal jurisdiction and the governing procedure, the 
burden of establishing “the grounds for removal” rests with the party 
seeking removal.143  
Finally, construing the Forum Defendant Rule as a jurisdictional 
road block does not undermine Supreme Court precedent.144 As an 
initial matter, Grubbs did not address the issue presented to the Lively 
court.145 Moreover, under the reasoning offered by the Eighth Circuit, 
an action removed in violation of the statutory grant of removal 
jurisdiction was never properly before the district court.146 Here, the 
removal was objected to—albeit by the district court—before any 
 
 142. Section 1441 states that an action “shall be removable only if none of the . . . 
defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.” Id. (emphasis added). 
However, the Lively court’s interpretation would require a remanding party to use the presence 
of a forum defendant as a basis for remand. Lively, 456 F.3d at 940 (“[A procedural 
characterization of] the forum defendant rule allows the plaintiff to regain some control over 
forum selection by requesting that the case be remanded to state court [if the action was 
removed in violation of the Forum Defendant Rule].”). Thus, despite the clear statutory 
language that requires the removing party to establish “the grounds for removal,” see § 1441(b), 
the Lively construction requires the remanding party to establish that removal was improper. 
Consequently, the burden now rests with the remanding party, as opposed to the removing 
party, to prove that removal is improper. 
 143. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (2000). Essentially, the Lively decision requires the remanding 
plaintiff to produce evidence that the right to remove does not exist. This ignores the wealth of 
evidence, as pertaining the citizenship of the defendant(s), uniquely within the control of the 
removing defendant(s). Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 6, at 17. This problem will be 
compounded where there is a basis for evidentiary dispute as to the citizenship of one or all of 
the removing defendants.  
 144. Grubbs v. Gen. Elec. Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699, 701 (1972) (“[W]here after removal 
a case is tried on the merits without objection and the federal court enters judgment, the issue 
[becomes] not whether the case was properly removed, but whether the federal district court 
would have had original jurisdiction of the case had it been filed in that court.”). Essentially, the 
Supreme Court stated that removal jurisdiction becomes coextensive with original jurisdiction 
when three specific requirements have been met. First, there must be a trial on the merits. Id. 
Second, the plaintiff must not have objected to removal prior to final judgment. Id. Finally, a 
federal court must have entered a final judgment. Id.  
 At the time the Lively decision was announced, none of the three requirements of Grubbs 
had been satisfied. Consequently, the Grubbs decision was irrelevant. Moreover, the Grubbs 
decision necessary implies that removal jurisdiction and original jurisdiction are not 
coextensive unless the elements enumerated in Grubbs are satisfied. Here, however, the Lively 
court collapsed the two components of federal jurisdiction without the required showing.  
 145. See supra notes 122–25 and accompanying text. 
 146. See supra notes 128–31 and accompanying text. The question is not whether the 
action would have been in the original jurisdiction of the district court had the action been 
initially filed there, but rather whether, as the facts have developed, the action was ever in front 
of the court. 
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trial on the merits, let alone final judgment.147 In fact, Supreme Court 
precedent arguably requires a jurisdictional interpretation of the 
Forum Defendant Rule.148 At the very least, the Grubbs decision cast 
doubt on the propriety of the Lively decision.149 
These differing interpretive approaches, standing alone, are likely 
insufficient to resolve the conflict.150 Where statutes, such as the 
removal scheme, are amenable to conflicting views, courts should 
consider, from a practical perspective, the implications of their 
decisions. If this exercise had been undertaken by the Lively court, 
policy would seem to dictate the opposite conclusion. 
III. PROPOSAL 
Disparate results that potentially could arise by increasing 
defendant access to the federal courts should encourage the Supreme 
Court to grant Petitioner a writ of certiorari.151 Aside from the textual 
and interpretative problems raised by the Lively decision,152 there was 
considerable disregard for the policy implications of the decision.153 
Along with the previously identified interpretative problems of 
 
 147. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 148. Reply Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Lively v. Wild Oats 
Mkts., 456 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2006) (No. 06-748), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1265 (2007). The 
Petitioner states: 
Reliance on Grubbs ignores entirely this Court’s holding in Martin v. Snyder, 148 U.S. 
663 (1893), which is directly on point. As the petition explains (at 14), Martin 
specifically held that a defendant’s failure to satisfy the forum defendant rule results in 
a ‘want of jurisdiction.’ As such, this Court vacated a decree in the defendant’s favor 
and remanded the case to state court. 148 U.S. at 664. Respondent does not even 
mention—much less distinguish—Martin, which has never been overruled or called 
into question by this Court. 
Id.  
 149. See supra note 144. 
 150. However, it probably should. A long line of precedent requires courts to strictly 
construe removal statutes in favor of not exercising jurisdiction. See generally Breuer v. Jim’s 
Concrete of Brevard, Inc., 538 U.S. 691 (2003) (discussing the policy to narrowly construe 
removal legislation but finding it inadequate to issue remand); Takeda v. Nw. Nat’l Life Ins. 
Co., 765 F.2d 815, 818 (9th Cir. 1985) (“We strictly construe the removal statute against 
removal jurisdiction.”) (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-9 
(1940)). 
 151. See supra notes 57–82 and accompanying text.  
 152. See supra notes 126–48 and accompanying text.  
 153. See supra notes 155–69 and accompanying text.  
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Lively, concepts of judicial comity,154 fundamental fairness, and 
judicial economy deserve equal consideration upon any ultimate 
Supreme Court review. 
A. On Grounds of Comity, Federal Courts Should Resolve This 
Ambiguity in Favor of a Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Forum 
Defendant Rule 
Due to the federalism concerns inherent in removal jurisdiction,155 
federal courts should, in absence of a clear jurisdictional command,156 
refuse to exercise jurisdiction for reasons of judicial comity.157 
This practice would not be new. For example, in cases involving 
multinational parties, U.S. courts have refused to exercise subject-
matter jurisdiction because a foreign jurisdiction should resolve the 
controversy.158 These courts reason, in part, that other jurisdictions 
have a superior interest in the resolution of the matter and that the 
local legislature (of the forum) likely did not intend to govern the 
 
 154. “The recognition and respect that a court of one state or jurisdiction shows to another 
state or jurisdiction in giving effect to the other’s laws and political decisions.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 863 (8th ed. 2004). 
 155. See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.  
 156. Here assume, arguendo, that the Forum Defendant Rule does not provide a restriction 
on the subject-matter jurisdiction of the district courts. While this interpretation is incorrect, 
assuming its validity will assist in reaching the correct result through a different method of 
analysis.  
 157. This is why, generally speaking, removal statutes are strictly construed. See supra 
note 150. 
 158. See generally F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164–65 
(2004). The Supreme Court stated: 
This Court ordinarily construes ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable interference 
with the sovereign authority of other nations. This rule of construction reflects 
principles of customary international law—law that (we must assume) Congress 
ordinarily seeks to follow. This rule of statutory construction cautions courts to assume 
that legislators take account of the legitimate sovereign interests of other nations when 
they write American laws. It thereby helps the potentially conflicting laws of different 
nations work together in harmony—a harmony particularly needed in today’s highly 
interdependent commercial world. 
Id. (citations omitted). There are many cases where U.S. courts have exercised jurisdiction over 
multinational cases, seemingly at odds with the idea of judicial comity. However, the point 
remains the same, courts do—and should—respect the jurisdiction and judgments of foreign 
courts, especially where the interests of the foreign court are superior to the interests of the 
forum court.  
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specific behavior at issue and that ambiguity should be resolved in 
favor of declining jurisdiction.159 Moreover, the principle of judicial 
comity also exists in domestic cases, as embodied by principle of 
forum non conveniens.160 
Quite obviously, these judicial tools were developed for situations 
similar to the issue presented in Lively.161 In Lively, a federal court 
divested a state court of competent jurisdiction, where reasonable 
minds could disagree as to the propriety.162 Considering the policy 
reasons behind removal in general and the principle of judicial 
comity, federal courts should refuse to exercise jurisdiction in similar 
cases.163 Where the legislative motive is undisturbed, federal courts 
 
 159. Id. These rationales are sound and illustrate why merely being capable to exercise 
jurisdiction (again, assuming the Forum Defendant Rule is procedural) does not necessarily 
mean that a court must exercise jurisdiction. 
 160. See generally 32A AM. JUR. 2d Federal Courts §§ 1353–73 (2007) (outlining the 
considerations for the application of forum non conveniens).  
 “Forum non conveniens” is a species of the genus for judicial comity. The factors that 
inform the deference to foreign jurisdictions seem to inform the decision to dismiss a case under 
the principle of forum non conveniens, with some notable additions. In deciding whether an 
action should be dismissed on the grounds of forum non conveniens, the Supreme Court has 
outlined two important aspects to consider: (1) the affect on the private litigants, and (2) the 
affect on the public interest. See generally Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); Piper 
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). Effects to the private litigants include: the ease of 
access to evidence; the availability of compulsory process; the burdens to witnesses; and any 
other practical considerations that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive in 
another forum. See 32A AM. JUR. 2d Federal Courts § 1367. Effects on the public include: the 
administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; the local interest in having localized 
controversies decided at home; the interest in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that 
is at home with the law that must govern the action; and avoiding the difficult task of applying 
foreign law. See id. § 1370. 
 161. Again, this assumes that the Forum Defendant Rule is procedural. If such assumption 
is correct, the situation presented in Lively is one where two courts, both having proper subject-
matter jurisdiction, are called upon to resolve one case. 
 162. See supra note 97 and notes 114–23. 
 163. See supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text. In cases such as Lively, the legislative 
motives for enacting the governing statutes are not invoked. The reasons for removal are to 
provide an expert forum in cases involving questions of federal law. Moreover, when diversity 
jurisdiction would exist, the purpose of removal is to protect out-of-state defendants from 
answering in a forum hostile to foreigners. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.  
 Here, however, there are no questions of federal law. Lively v. Wild Oats Mkts., 456 F.3d 
933, 936 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1265 (2007). Moreover, the defendant was not 
asked to defend in a forum hostile to its status as a California resident (granted, this assumes 
that Californian residents do not discriminate against other Californian residents). On the 
contrary, the opposite is probably true, at least if the general rationale for removal of diversity 
cases is correct. Here, a foreign domiciliary seeks redress in the forum of his adversary. If there 
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should respect the competent jurisdiction of the states, just as it 
would respect the competent jurisdiction of foreign countries.164 
Moreover, it is troubling that federal courts afford greater deference 
to foreign courts than they do to the courts of their own country. 
B. On Grounds of Fundamental Fairness and Judicial Economy, 
Federal Courts Should Resolve This Ambiguity in Favor of a 
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Forum Defendant Rule 
The rule announced by the Lively court creates a perverse 
incentive for defendants to remove in violation of the Forum 
Defendant Rule.165 This illogical rule will likely cause defendants to 
seek removal where there is any ambiguity as to their citizenship.166 
Under the Lively interpretation of the Forum Defendant Rule, 
defendants will be more likely to remove because the burden of 
establishing the propriety of the removal has been shifted to the party 
seeking a remand.167  
The increase in defendant removals will strain federal judicial 
resources in two significant ways. Under the Lively interpretation, 
federal district courts will be called on to settle initial evidentiary 
disputes as to the citizenship of the removing defendant(s). This, in 
turn, will result in either determining that the removal was 
improper—as it violated the Forum Defendant Rule—or that the 
removal was proper. In either event, federal district courts have 
invested significant resources into questions that could be better 
 
ever be a time where removal would seem unnecessarily oppressive and vexatious, it is 
certainly on these facts.  
 164. See supra note 163. 
 165. See supra notes 128–43 and accompanying text. 
 166. First, recall that defendants are much more successful in federal courts. See supra 
notes 61–65 and accompanying text. Consequently, any rational defendant would like to have 
its status adjudicated in a federal forum. Moreover, the Lively decision essentially shifts the 
burden of proving the presence a local defendant on the plaintiff. See supra note 143. In cases 
where the dispute is a close call, defendants will benefit from this shifted burden, as the plaintiff 
may not be able to provide sufficient evidence to conclusively establish the local residency of 
one of the defendants.  
 167. Recall that defendants are much more likely to prevail in federal court. See supra 
notes 60–65. As such, rational defendants would like to reduce the likelihood of losing on the 
merits. The Lively interpretation encourages defendants, especially defendants with ambiguous 
citizenship, to seek removal. The burden will then shift to the party seeking remand to establish 
a removal in violation of the Forum Defendant Rule. See supra notes 139–43. 
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avoided by a proper construction of the Forum Defendant Rule. 
Second, by favoring removal, there is a substantial likelihood that 
more state law claims will be adjudicated in federal courts.168 While it 
is true that our federal system assumes that the federal courts are 
experts on questions of federal law, the same cannot be said as to 
questions of state law.169  
Essentially, viewing the Forum Defendant Rule as a procedural 
speed bump on the road to the merits casts too broad a net over 
matters that are only of local concern. Moreover, such an 
interpretation provides a wily litigant with the means to sneak within 
the ambit of that excessively broad net.  
CONCLUSION 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to review the 
Lively decision on February 27, 2007. As a result, what is left is a 
non-uniform and faulty removal regime. Congress or the Court 
should revisit this issue, with an eye for reversing the holding in 
Lively. If followed, a new disposition could alleviate many of the 
interpretive problems present in the Lively decision. Essentially, a 
reversal would properly produce a statutory scheme of removal, the 
congressional intent of a clearly delineated and distinct removal and 
original jurisdiction scheme, the proper burden allocation of the 
statute, and Supreme Court precedent. Moreover, reversal would 
recognize the equal standing of the state court judicial system, and 
protect the federal judiciary from unnecessary and burdensome 
evidentiary disputes and questions of state law. 
 
 168. Recall that nearly 12 percent of all cases in federal court are removed cases. See supra 
note 83. Increasing access to the federal courts will likely increase this number.  
 169. See supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text. In fact, the rationale behind removal 
jurisdiction requires quite the opposite conclusion. We allow federal questions to be removed 
because we want the experts of federal law involved. This seems to support the conclusion that 
the court more familiar with the action should evaluate the merits. Most likely, this rationale is 
supported on grounds of judicial efficiency and uniformity of results. The Lively decision 
effectively undermines this rationale by divesting state courts of jurisdiction over state law 
claims and in-state parties.  
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